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Disunit/, distance, disregard:
The political failure of Islamism in late
colonial Indonesia
Islamisme adalah satu bentuk pemikiran Islam ynng menempntkan agama
pada posisi sentral dalam kehidupan masyarakat, termasuk bidang politik
'dan 
kenegaraan. Islam dalam konteks ini dijadiknn sebuah narasi utnma
yang,selaindipatenknnsebagaisebuahideologi,iugadipahnmisebagai
artikulasi /erjuangan politik yang memiliki spectrum beragam. lnlur yang
ditempuh oleh para pengusungnya (kaum Islamis) tersebar utamanya
melalui pembentukan hegemoni moral dan intelektual untuk mempengn-
ruhi wilayah ciail society. Padaleztel indiaidukitabisa mencqtat misalnya
muncul Alimin, anggota sI yang banyak terpengaruh ide-ide komunis,
sementara padn tingknt kelembagaan tercatat pernn beberapa partai na-
sionalis-kebangsann seperti Partai Nasional lndonesia (PNI) didirikan
pada 1927; semuanya menentang segala proses hegemoni dnn pergeraknn
knlangan Islsmis di Indonesia
oitam sejarah Indonesin, gerakan islamis mendapatkan momentum
kebangkitannya seiring munculnya Sarekat Islam (SI) yang didirikan
di solo 17 Noaember 1912. Pada perkembangannya, organisasi yang
merupaknn bentuk lanjut dari syariknt Dagang Islam (sDl)-didirikan
obh k.U. Samanhudi tahun 1-905-ini, bermetamorfosis ke dalam Partai
sarekat lstam (PSI) yang dibentuk tahun L927 , sebelum akhirnya berubah
menjadi Partai sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSil) pada 1929. Melaluibebera-
pa tiokoh utamanya seperti Hnji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934)'
' 
H aj i Agus S alim ( L 8 B 4-1 g 5 4) or g anis nsi ini b er up ay a mendis s emin asiknn
gagasa"n-gagasan keislamanny a. salim misalnya sangat gencar mengkritik
"niion tiri, yang dianggapnya sangat rentan jatuh pada imperialisme
dan kolonialisme B ar nt'
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Dan dari sinilah cerita diskursus ideologibermula. Indonesia yang kala
itu sedang berada dalam proses pencarian bentuk idearnya sebagai sebuah
negar a-b ang s a, disemar aknn p er gulat an dua kutub ideilo gis-Js ehin ko-
munis- yakni kalangan pengusung lslamisme (Islam potitilc) di satu sisi
dan mereka yang umum disebut sebagai knrangan nasionar sekurer (pseu-
do-secular nationalists) di sisi lain. Maka, aroma pertarungan ideologi ter_
s ebut t erus menj al ar hin g g a b eb er ap a d e c a d e s er anj ut ny al Rent an g i ahun
1920-an, pihak nasionalis kembali membuka alur perdibatan ters;ebut de-
ngan menuduh Agus sarim sebagai indiuidu pemecah belahkalangan pri-
bumi lawa. Terlebih ketika pada tahun 1928, beberapa murid Ag)s salim
yang awalnya bergabung daram long laua, mendirikan long Isramieten
Bond (IIB/ Ikatan Pemuda Isram) yang juga menjad.i prnrgi, Isramisme
di Indonesia.
selain sI, organisasi rain yang juga turut menegasknn eksisistensi
gerakan ini adalah Persatuan Islam (persis). Didirikan di Bandung ta-
hun 1923, organisasi ini sedari awal menolak secara tegas nasionalisme.
Dalam pandangan persis-seperti disuaraknn oreh pindirinya Ahmad
Hasan- konsep nation-state sangat berbahaya bagi eksistensi komunitas
muslim global. Islam dalam pandangannya meraring setiap orang untuk
terlibat bahkan bergabung dalnm setiap gerakan nasionalis yang 
"*rrupo-
knn sebuah bentuk kemurtadan. serain itu, ada juga persatian"Muslimin
Indonesia (Permi) yang didirikan tahun 1930 olei Ilyas ya,qub dan Haji
Mucht nr Luthfi'pt 6uany a mer up akan rulusan Mesir-s eL ag ai bentuk
lanjut dari perkembangan gerakan sumatera Thawalib di sumitera.
selain melalui beberapa organisasi tersebut, isramisme juga mencoba di
tumbuh-kembangkan melalui ranah media-terkhusus meiia cetak-se-
perti surat kabar, majalah, pamflet, brosur ataupun buku-bukw keisraman.
Penting di catat di sini adalah kemunculan majatah pembelq Islam terbit_
nn Persis ataupun Suara Muslim, yang akhirnya sangat berperan penting
bagi terjadinya disseminasi pemikiran keislqmalan saat itu:. Melalui me-
dia-media itulah, Mohammad Natsir, murid Agus sarim, Haji Rosut (Hnji
Ahmad Karim Amrullah), serta beberapa kaum Islamis lainnya melibatknn
diri dalam pusnran perdebatan dengan pihak nasionaris ataupun pihak lain
yang gencar mengritik pemikiran_pemikiran kaum islamis.
Akhir tahun 1g20an, saat dimana nasionarisme memuncak dan Isram
berhasil menjadi sebuah ide pemersatu, gerakan Islamisme tak sepenuhnya
dapat memanfaatkan moment yang ada. Alih-arihberhasil mewarnai ben-
tuk bangunan Indonesia, geraknn ini justru larut dalam pusaran konflik
internal. Geraknn Islamisme terlihat sangat lemah jika dibanding organt-
sasi lain yang menjadi oposisinya.
Studin lslamika, VoL 16, No. 1, 2009
Robert E. Elson
Disunity, distance, disregard:
The political failure of Islamism in late
colonial Indonesia
AJ. \f )" l)L-)l J,* Jt o,;;f,"5 4/>\-)l j.+r f .r; :i.e1!1
IU.r' f e-L- ,* L# rr ;+l .-ilF -;a f*l Cl :.fL.j*)t ;r=!t ,ui)\-*-F I .srlr, L"Li +\s-, C:o\ il*Jr I'r-o J l),1*)l1 .q -btAr
o+-Dts.:,*Jl 
-i#l {.r5 s-L- -K e di r+- L>-i } ,+}y.+K
AYr ,,Ic /i:U :,putr, ;6tt-r a^.ft ;F ur*"y-!l o;L.a,i L6L ,rl
.Jb f^rl)l ,...;*l )"p\:e 7+ o4t ,/!1 lj-a G*+JriYl cj-LJl ,jf*Jl J JlUF,: e,-3-J;ll-:" :ti:p!r g G! n^a- c--,--c\ 6-S +y-)t oi
g+-s &: at7 -zr. o-f-*.5 dJ l- {i t't .r2Jl Jt'a .6rs
spt*l\ A;;-It ,J dl5 1-:l .g,o:;*y oJ4jt") Q"Ic LJl: o_f _*- A*-ty
,&i & f -t- Jl it " (5ijt "4f,y-)1 lfft" ,) *p J^J ",lJT" .l4
Partai Nasional qr-+J-u)l ,*-l\ +r te cr*lt cse:-Jt cp (*y-
J ,f-*- i'r,r6-" t4*i1 \ 1YV ai- ,*L g;jJl Indonesia (PNI)
'LaJt-.jiJ +)L-)l ;'.,tl cslo orjr(:
u--f; C @.*Lr *-t.& J)'a1" r-r;;.)L!l otf ;-;r.11 3
A: .-ly. d \ 1\ Y pLc c*L Cl Sutukat Islam (SD ./1-)1 +fll
SyarikatDagang +)L-)l ;Jl-o:Jl 6i JId-f ,\1.o lLe 6-,-h
d (K.H. Samanhudi a;:;,el,L UtIt g[f a+i ,]t lslam (SDI)
?.F c+ciy t lf V lLo .-l 4/)\-)l iKt:'J\ qf JL a;\;y .19
ct Partai Sarekat Islam hrdonesia (PSII) +'*y.r;)l +)L-)l l5til\
Haji ,r-t\s-fu r":- re etJ-l J, G:l"i;a JX+.r, .\lYq aj-
Haji Agus & ,r*l aultg .Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-L934
et-|lJ .+)'t-Yl oyt(ii .Arn & e " +*t otf cSalim (1884-1954)i t p)J a;trr Larjri;Jr a*"lt ;fdt * -r;:q ;tf >\i lL 
-n,."i- l-J ) )J r' - e 
'\'r'' al'Ls:-)lJ t;#l'
ill- 
.J !*r;rl c-:t-f ;lt oi^ dJ .F!.,i+Vt ilt,-" oi* ua ajl
,-.V +j-y-+)l .r Jth" Xb !l cal;: G_j(J Jri (J ,f c.^)l
3 Studia lslamikn, VoL 16, No. 1,2009
4 Robert E. Elson
&* ;)t1 4/)L-)l a"-t-Jl a{ }\ )\di d Ji^ri Jylt -^L;lt, ca2oy:.J\
c-,19J1 C rtu- L* A-l-y.-l-Yt ltr.alt J\{ .A*}t 6 }t atUai C
o*_* :-fll J-rlt a--* -u"-t- ,y +r)\ rvi e c\ 1y. lte cl1 .4uJl
t^*- Y .a,k$l d4J1t4l ,t"A :,-. ()e^.t .Jtl trL t)"r;\ eV\ .,le ft6!1
"/q:Jl ,Fl" U ..r^4 ,-rl-f fS 
"*fy J-"*Jl ,ary 3L,o 
j! \ c y o lto ,-s
^*j,yai J. tSg a;.rJl ;rrJ*Il .:!.:Jl tVt u*j f call.rJl ,J ".x;t1.1
.L*'+1-i;J d 61-)l
,-*S 6)t.-t^ ,ri" l{g S;\ a^b, J*i ca*").-!l 4SAl -;V-
\ 1Y I pLe g s4 tS ,*'U g;Jl Persatuan Islam (Fersis) "p),[-!l :t-+1"
-r-,+i ,.*;" ot-! p),t-)l :t-+t 61- .a-\to *jt o""1" a,-lrJl jj" criJl-,
cij J lL)tJ.jlur ;pl-lr ee tf S -:-r-r ":"lr ilJJl ;F ii J/*
4^b-u l*^-i.dL-o .6:Jt Ltyi ,y Larr^+y &s {r \i c !p- J" lt
d! Petsutuan Muslimin Indonesia (Permi) ".1-*rj-u)i ;s-I*ll :t-41"
,y ws GA )\s UV\1 ,+'.-,t.rUl .s+i .,lc' f qy. 4!- U c**'1.;
.;h-y- i.)\*;-b,y 6r ,-b;,:1-u"1 d\)\A\a*Vt u;;;fi o::b') u)+ (;Jf-rll crL!:It Jy. 
.r" ;Vf g;y;l 3,
c,)fAl; rjt+l J*, c,Lc;f"ll J a-?V fyr)t JL-J Jt4 ,J 4/)Ll
Pembela" zf,l\ ,r*p,:i t^ ;,U'>lf \ p^s.a"")\-!t 
=KJl_, -.,I;y-:;Il;SLLara" ilAl Ji PERSIS l1-)l :Vt ub-u.r (CX-)l ;e 7\i-t)\;"IslamlJ, i +y-l t&i ,, ,J L-e. 1;1-: e-L .'lt-f 1,J.Jl o;) "Muslim
* u*t +J :^_r ,-cl -t^-+,il-f fy-cll J;L*J o-ra J)b .f .drtJ if f-'".ri!l .4."y-)l uzal 1i:tyiff -t*i 6_V\7 J-., 6.Vt1
,ki J'\F oJ;;t-;,rJt ;;1r y ti L+j)t;,ful )rai 3.lr+r
..rs")L")l r)P
;"-t Jl --,tfy-X 4:V o*t Jt ,-N kJtB .it-4 ilUit oia ,-rl
J-ilJl dlr1 Frj; ,,Ic .Xi< ,r*; c;L-":-!l pt_i U +--*t-u!l e/y-Yl
,3s .!:-..*sut 3 +-t"Jl 3uij J1i 
"t 
J La-:5-* J Lt-Y ,V)*! ag/
cas-r" ;,* e*i fL)l_r cta:^i 3 &s 6 r cjtt il \ 1y . pLc ,=tf i
oj-A 6.*r .ns1 .J.t<J\ o-atrt ora J>\.:-t J +y-,1 a{ ? ;t^s I
.r&Jl si".lJl LlAt C t: 6^J !**;-i;! "t! a"^LJt C at Jl ^{ }t
cSrLUl cse:*J.t C TtrAt ,lt-f ,JLdl &* ,tr a."X-)t 6 d\ a^)a:" 3,
Jl rstt c\ 1YY a:* g "t:tlJt-tr-") "IJL*S-" al\3t z*;;,,r++ q5jJl
,-F +*t 
",nt* 
Jl WV'i 0-1.*, k+ k cLr\tl p JL a^L'll &*,S;i a'-V ,y) ( +U y ,-nJ.|') (S: E) r*Ln- 7lS y-J- trolJl ar$)! ._y--ty,_y:51 ,-*-.,\1uJJ p-64\ J, ci*nJt itJt Jl
oU:Jl 
.r- Ag +\ a+*;\r:-ly ;.^J:uJ.l o;1:l la-r tJ. t-b-,U z*>)l a/l r?WtJ-{l (Jle il_,til! z"-tAJ 4}{-b 4r,)L-)l 6}t s"; ctat+,o\l ;#L!l
.G +;-rt'Ir Ji!l
Studia Islamikn, VoL 16, No. 1, 2009
. 
Disunity, distance, disregard: The potiticat t'ailure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 5
t took Islamism-by which I mean the belief that Islamic val-
ues must systematically guide and interpenetrate the state and,
as a consequence, society at large-until the third decade of the
twentieth century to assert itself politically in Indonesia. Even then,
Islamism remained underdeveloped and vague in idea and pur-
pose. In the late 1920s, however, with the destruction by the colo-
.riul gorr"ttt*ent of its major oPPonent, the Indonesian Communist
Partl,, there seemed to be an opportunity for Islamism to make a
decisive advance and perhaps even to fill the political space vacated
by populist Marxism'
- 
rnat opportunity was never taken up effectively. For the most
part, the list decade or so of the colonial period witnessed Islamism's
intellectually unsophisticated, internally divided and counter-pro-
ductive efforts to progress its agenda. This article examines the
failure of Islamism to make a greater political impact in Indonesia
through these years. That failure would have decisive ramifications
for the future shape of the Indonesian state, in that it left Islamism
politically and intellectually impoverished and politically margin-
arcea in ihe face of the dominant claims of pseudo-secular national-
ists. In part, its failure flowed from organisational and administra-
tive weakness, but it was centrally rooted in the strategic, political
and intellectual shortcomings of Islamist politicians'
An Islamist Sarekat Islam
In the late1920s,while it no longer dominated the political scene
as it had in the mid-1910s, the sarekat Islam (Islamic Association)
movement remained easily the largest political grouping in the
Indies. No longer a broad umbrella for Muslims of every stripe, it
now identified itself as the Partai sarekat Islam (sarekat Islam Party
- 
psD, and had moved, as a consequence of its long and debilitat-
ing competition with the Communists, to adopt a firmly Islamist
po"sition. But the party faced numerous problems. The_ ideologi-
cal narrowing resulting from its Islamist turn had weakened the
populist image of its charismatic leader, Umar said Cokroaminoto;
;'Hull Cokt o';, il was said, "is no longer the Cokroaminoto of old"'1
There were allegations of corruption against the party leadership,
financial management was weak and ineffective. The bulk of the
party,s 20,000-odd members were purely nominal and inanimate,
ir, ,o*" places its numbers were in decline, and the party was no-
tably unsuccessful in establishing institutions like cooperatives and
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unions to improve the economic circumstances of the masses.2 As
well, Indonesian Islamists were only slowly coming to terms with
the dismal reality of the final collapse of the pan-Islamic caliphate
movement inI927.3
The greatest challenge confronting the psl and Islamism in gen-
eral, however, was the sudden emergence and surging popularity
of the arresting new idea of Indonesia: the notion that the territory
of the Netherlands East Indies was a modern nation-in-becoming
and that it should be free from the grip of Dutch colonialism. That
idea had developed only slowly through the 1910s and had previ-
ously been expressed most unequivocally amongst the tiny group
of Indonesian students in the Netherlands and latlr in a smill fllrn:
ber of study clubs at home.a It became firmry institutionalised only
in7927 with the founding of sukarno's Indonesian National party(Perserikatan (later Partai) Nasional Indonesia 
- 
pND. Growing
consciousness of the national, combined with the simple, deeplv atl
tractive idea of freedom, inevitably meant that the 
-"rrug"^oi th"idea of Indonesia was cast in terms of broad inclusiveness and unity
based solely upon commitment to the imagined nation. As sukarno
himself put it, "the existence of different languages and religions
need be no hindrance to the forming of a nation".s Indeed, he mad.e it
clear that the PNI "would be closed to religion, because [otherwise]
.... not only would important groups which would be able to give
necessary support in the construction of the Fatherland be exclud-
ed, but at the same time there would be wrangling and discord".6 A
Christian newspaper correspondent echoed that view: nationalism
"requires a complete cooperation of the nationalists, setting aside
all religions. only then can the goal of nationalism, nationa-l inde-
pendence, be easily achieved".T perennially trapped between local
and universalistic dimensions of its beliefs-including the notion
that Islam was "super-territorial"8-Islamism found great difficulty
in accommodating its profound sense of ,,being Muslim,, with the
surging pre-eminence of the rapidly gestating, ieligiously non-spe-
cific idea of Indonesia.
Defensive exclusivism
By the end of the 1920s, the PSI, in the words of petrus Blumberger,
"thought Islam to be the means par excellence to awaken the popu-
lar spirit and to keep it alert; they can conceptualise no democracy,
socialism or nationalism separate from Allah and his religion".e But
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the party's mood bore few signs of confidence or assurance. Its atti-
tude was characterised by a mood of stubbornly defensive, assertive
resentment towards the religiously-neutral politicians who had rid-
den the rising tide of the idea of Indonesia and rapidly established
themselves as the core of the Indonesian nationalist movement.
There emerged amongst Islamists a sense that Muslims were being
boycotted, ignored, not accorded their due, their ideas not consid-
ered worthy or relevant, not embraced and employed by their fel-
lows. Thus, asked Pembela Islam, the monthly journal of the Islamist
Persatuan Islam (Islamic Unity - Persis) specifically established to
defend Islam in the face of attack, "does not that [religious] neutral-
ity narrow the means for uniting itself with the religious group?
Does not that neutrality become a hatred of religion, especially the
religion of Islam?"1o Further, it asked of "those who do not like reli-
gion, who are opposed to the religion of Islam, the religion of most
people in Indonesia .... what is a people without soul? What does a
people or a country mean which has no spirit? And if the religion of
Islam is not acknowledged, upon what does marriage stand, what
is the basis of life and heritage?"LlPSI leader Haji Agus Salim felt
impelled to ask whether the adoption of religious neutrality by a
nationalist youth grouP was a statement to the effect that "religious
principles among the young are dead".12 In response to Sukarno's
assertion of his great regard for Islam and other religions, Pembela
Islam asked "how can people hold Islam in high regard if they do
not apply Islamic principles?"13
Nonetheless, the PSI found itself forced to seek some common
ground with the surging, even dominant, power of the nationalist
message. By late L929, there were more than 5,000 PNI members in
Bandung alone, three times that location's membership earlier that
year.la Salim remarked on "the growth of the spirit of an Indonesian
unity, which is felt more and more as a need in the Indonesian na-
tion that is coming to be and which, indeed, is also beginning to live
amongst the broad swath of the people".1s The idea of Indonesia,
in short, was a powerful idea that could not be ignored and had to
be engaged. "Don't think", remarked a prominent PSI figure, S.M.
Kartosoewiryo, "that we in the nationalist group which is based
on Islam and Islamic matters do not dream of a free Indonesia".16
Pembela Islsmremarked that the PSI had "never been afraid to jump
into the breach for nationalist associations and leaders, irrespective
of religious , racial or party differences".lT
Studia lslamikn, Vol. 15, No. 1,2009
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Islamism's developing desire to embrace the idea of Indonesia
was expressed most obviously in the addition of the word
"Indonesia" to PSI's name in1929; it became the Sarekat Islam Party
of Indonesia (PSII).18 Indeed, as early as lg27l Cokroaminoto had
included a special section on nationalism, edited by Sukarno and
Sartono, in the PSII newspaper Bandera lslam.le Even far away in
Mecca and Cairo,Indonesian Muslims were appropriating the dis-
course of "Indonesia".2o Bttt Islamist efforts to demonstrate Islam's
compatibility with the national struggle and, indeed, the necessity
for Islamic thinking to leaven nationalism,2l were generally guarded
and restrained; its engagement with religiously-neutral nationalism
was one in which Islam's ascendancy was always deemed upper-
rnost and it was underlined by a strong suspicion that the national-
ists were essentially anti-Islamic.22 While Salim asserted that "we are
a dead people, and will become a stinking corpse if we do not strive
for national freedom",23 and while the young Kasman Singodimejo
argued that "nationalism and internationalism cannot be separated
from each other .... Islam considers nationalism as one of its obliga-
liorrs" ,24 Cokroaminoto remarked that "we can.... strive for freedom,
but our greatest goal remains Islam".25 "Nationalism",he later re-
marked, "cannot bring freedom, that can only be obtained by means
of Islam".26 Kasman himself remarked that "ihe best means of unity
.... is Islam",27 and thought of Islam as "the national religion", add-
ing that "the obligation rests on our leaders, in every case, to know
this religion, even if they are not themselves Muslim, for certainly
80"/" of the Indonesian people are Muslims".28
Moreover, Islamists saw freedom essentially as the means to im-
prove faith and devotion. Leaders spoke of "the striving in a legal
manner towards the freedom of 'hrdonesia' as the major condition
for an undisturbed prosperity and growth of the Muslim religion and
for the lifting up of land and people on a democratic-religious basis".2e
Cokroaminoto thought of Indonesia's freedom as the "first condition
for the free and undisturbed faith in the Muslim religion",3o while
maintaining that "in order for 'Freedom' to be obtained as speed-
ily as possible, members need to develop the conviction they must
feel themselves subject only to God".31 Wondosudirjo (later known
as Wondoamiseno), a senior PSII figure, asserted that "we want our
own law, handed down in the Qur'an and hadith, applied in relations
between man and women/ between brothers, between nations"/ even
as he recognised the specific authority of government, "on which we
do not want to tread" .32 Cokroaminoto asserted that the PSII not only
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strove "for independence but also wished that the Muslims of the
whole world should stand under one flag".33 For the West java PSII
leader, Aruji Kartawinata, the goal was "freedom from slavery, rais-
ing up of Islam, and the freeing of 'Indonesia"'.34 SuryoPranoto/ a
veteran labour leader and PSII notable, remarked that the PSII "in
the first place strives for what Islam prescribes but after that stands
in great sympathy for action for a free Indonesia".3s For Pembela lslam,
Indonesia was, above all else, " aland of Islam"'36
Despite this fixity of idea, PSII shared some ideological similari-
ties with nationalist grouPs. Like some of them, it adopted a policy
of non-cooperation with the colonial government (which meant,
most of all, the refusal to serve in various colonial advisory coun-
cils), which it termed its hijrah policy; it signified its wish, as Salim
remarked, to remain "exclusively independent in its work of feeding
the people".37 Like many of the nationalists, PSII opposed capitalism
and imperialism which "must be uprooted root and branch",38 and
which "just like Satan are enemies of Islam".3e According to PSII no-
table Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo, who had been in 1925 chair of the sec-
ularist Perhimpunan Indonesia student group in the Netherlands
and who was close to the nationalists, Islam's goal of creating a
"'peaceful world" implied the struggle against those things like
"capitalism, imperialism, colonialism and so on" which disturbed
that peace.aO For Cokroaminoto himself, the certain fall of imperi-
alism and capitalism would "facilitate and accelerate the achieve-
ment of our goal: to obtain the freedom of the Community (Ummat)
(National freedom) in its fullness".al In the context of the nationalist
insistence on popular sovereignty, sukiman asserted that the PSII
too "honours democratic principles and strives for brotherliness".a2
But such similarities masked deep and abiding contradictions with
the thinking of the non-religious nationalists.
The end of the embrace
The PSI's efforts at engagement with the nationalists included
involvement with the PPPKI (Permufakatan PerhimPunan-Per-
himpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia), the confederation of na-
tionalist parties created by sukarno in 1927 to strive for enhanced
unity within the movement. While the PSI had initially welcomed
the PPPKI initiative, and sukiman had been an active architect in
its organisation, the relationship was an unhappy and reluctant
one almost from the start.a3 The fact that the unity signified by the
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PPPKI was always more symbolic than real, that member organisa-
tions could maintain their specific stances, and that the unanimity
of all members was required for the framing of policy, served both
to deaden and marginalise the federation's impact.aa Its unity, ac-
cordingly, was built "on loose sand".as Pembela Islam provided its
own resentful description of a PPPKI conference, remarking on
the behaviour of "Indonesian leaders", of "Mr,s" with their sturdy
and gallant appearance, eyes glowing with nationalist fire, quick of
movement and sharp of word; and then the "Dr,s", with penetratmg
eyes which stare into space, full of the highest ideals, oi the fines-i
feelings .... and of the two lowly people, representatives of the p.S.I. at
the congress, surrounded by all those "neutrals" who do not like Islam
.... yes, who hate Islam.a6
PSII members, notably Salim, were suspicious of what they saw
as the PPPKI's false unity, its secularist core, its anti-Islamic tenden-
cies,aT its lack of responsiveness to PSII complaints, and the com-
petition its dominant ideas offered to those of the pSII, and were
quick and regular in their criticism of it.48 Thus wounded, pppKl
supporters were quick to respond to these attacks with their own
vitriol; Mohammad Husni Thamrin spoke of the "self-centredness,,
of the PSII,ae while Samsi Sastrowidagdo penned a brochure entitled
"Defending the P.P.P.K.I.".50 One critic of the PSII thought it fanciful
to link religion with nationalism: "Religion is imperialistic, hege-
monic .... and just causes discord".sl Another asserted that " a politi-
cal association with Islam as its basis will bring division and will
find adherents only amongst serious Muslims".s2
By early 1930, the relationship was such that the pSII con-
gress sought to withdraw from the PPPKI, restrained only by
Cokroaminoto himself. But the extreme bitterness that arose as a
consequence of a series of anti-Islamic pieces that appeared in
Soeara Oemoem, the journal of another body attached to the pppKl,
Sutomo's Indonesian Study Club-they suggested, amongst other
criticisms of the hajj, that it was preferable to go to Boven Digul
as a political prisoner of the Dutch than to make the pilgrimage to
Meccas3-together with Sutomo's own uncompromising attitude
towards the PSII,sa further deepened PSII suspicion of non-religious
nationalism. PSII leader A.M. Sangaji, indeed, likened that nation-
alism to aggressive, expansionist and enslaving Western national-
ism and drew a contrast with the truth, peace and right of Islamic
nationalism.ss The party turned further in on its Islamist core and
finally withdrew from the PPPKI at the end of 1930.56
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From the PSII's point of view, of course, the party was in no way
anti-nationalist. It opPosed, rather/ the "anti-religious camP" in the
nationalist group,s7 such as those PNI leaders who condemned child
marriage and polygamy.tu A vague attempt to rejoin the PPPKI in
March 1931 came to nothing when the federation refused the PSII's
request to remove mention of "the IndonesianNation" from PPPKI's
regulations as a condition of PSII re-entry.se PSII also refused to par-
ticipate in the PPPKI's "Indonesia Raya" (Great Indonesia) congress;
in Salim's eyes, the congress represented " only a parade of unity. If
people want to hold a real national congress, then it must be an
'all party congress' in which decisions can be taken by a majority
of voices".60 Such developments were evidence of the growing es-
trangement between the PSII and the secular nationalist movement;
as one newspaper put it, "the national movement of Indonesia has
come to a phase in which the religious associations take their own
road .... the national parties can now work freely to achieve their
goal, without worrying about the limiting rules of religion".61 Salim,
for his part, thought an independent PSII would be "more produc-
tive than working together with other associations which have
different goals".62 Indeed, the growing sense that the nationalists
were a dangerous threat, and that Muslim solidarity essential, saw
Sukiman and Syam (Raden Syamsurijal) commissioned to study
whether that realisation should be acted upon; Syam concluded that
the PSII should no longer seek association with the nationalists but
rather pursue alliances with other religious movements, "which no
matter how bad they were still better than the anti-Islam-minded
nationalists".63
That strengthening sense of the Muslim community was reflect-
ed in the rebirth of the Al-Islam congress, the first since 1926 and
the eighth overall.6a The congress itself was notable for what had
by now become a characteristic sense of Muslim apprehension and
defensiveness and a high degree of sensitivity to anti-Islamic senti-
ment. A scathing attack on the Prophet by a Jesuit priest in Muntilan,
followed by a similarly fierce slander by a writer, Oei Bee Thay, in
a Surabaya rnagazine,65 prompted the Surabaya PSII branch to form
a local Al-Islam committee, and similar committees sPrang up else-
where, under PSII auspices, which "at public meetings [gave] voice
to the indignation aroused among Muslims".66 In mid-yeat, at a
meeting of forty-eight associations, PSII initiated the establishment
of a permanent Al-Islam Central Committee, intended to combat
and rebut "attacks and insults on the religion of Islam", to defend
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the name, purity and truth of Islam, and to connect the Indonesian
ummat with the ummnt overseas.6T Those efforts were followed by
another Al-Islam congress the following year in Malang, attended
by about 4,000 people,68 before the congress "shared the inglorious
fate of many other P.S.I.I. initiatives"6e and faded from view, not
to be revived until 7938.70 PSII's version of Muslim solidarity was
premised on its leadership and direction; it had no strong sense of
the need for broader intellectual or political collaboration with oth-
er Muslim groupings and remained essentially isolated from them.
The party was, in its own view, sufficient unto itself.
Sumatra: a new approach
PSII's efforts to realise it goals were mainly ]ava-based. In
Sumatra, however, where modernising reformers had made the
greEtest progress, a new kind of Muslim vision was emerging, in
large part in response to the need for a more aggressive politics to
combat the government's efforts to control religious instruction
through its Curu Ordinance.Tl In May 1930, the thriving and radi-
cally-minded Sumatera Thawalib school systemT2 transformed itself
into a politicalparty, the Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian
Muslim Union - Permi); it aimed to combine, just as PSII was at-
tempting to segregate them, the concepts of nationalism and reli-
gion. Permi pretended to a national, all-Indonesian, not just a re-
gional presence and influence, despite being almost entirely limited
to Sumatra. It was, as the Dutch Islam advisor Gob6e reported, an
expression of "a striving for development in a nationalist sense".73
Henceforth, one Dutch report opined, "the education at Sumatera-
Thawalib schools will be religious-nationalistic".Ta
In striking contrast to the PSII, Permi consciously modelled it-
self on the secular national parties; it based itself upon "Islam and
nationalism, parallel roads of politics",Ts and was particularly close
to the thinking of Sukarno. When Dutch officials searched Permi's
schools and premises in 1933, they found " a great quantity of politi-
cal propaganda of a radical nationalist kind", including such materi-
al as Sukarno's Mencapai Indonesia Merdeka, writings of Mohammad
Hatta and Muchtar Luthfi, PNI publications, and newspapers and
journals of the nationalist movement.T6 Sukarno himself lauded
Permi efforts to emphasise the nationalist aspects of the Islamic
struggle; "the two had a common ground in their obsession with
national urrity".77 Much more than their fellows in the PSII, these
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Sumatran intellectuals had been captivated by the idea of Indonesia,
"they already accept the name Indonesians".T8
Permi's attempt to synthesise nationalism and Islam contrasted
sharply with the rejection of nationalism by PSII and by Persis, a
small but influential body established in Bandung in 1923 and in-
tellectually shaped by the Singapore-born Tamil, Ahmad Hassan,Te
which focussed on spreading its ideas directly rather than on devel-
oping institutional strength.8o Permi, strengthened by the addition
of a number of Minangkabau activists returning from their studies
in Cairo and Mecca, was especially inspired by the thought of Ilyas
Ya'kub. As a student in Cairo, he had closely studied the experi-
ence of the Egyptian nationalist movement before his return in early
1930 and he privileged the nation as the key modern political for-
mat.81 Permi sought to combine the power of the idea of Indonesia
with Islam in new ways which gave apPropriate emphasis to what
had hitherto been contending streams of thinking. Its explicit ideo-
logical foundations were Islam and nationalism (kebangsaan); each
needed the other for humankind's full development.82 As one Permi
leader put it, "Men, no matter in whatever age or place they live,
always have the feelings of religion and nationality. Religion is a
spiritual feeling in our heart .... nation is a group of people who are
bound together by various social and cultural ties".83 In that sense,
"Islam and nationalism are not to be divided and love for the land
of one's birth is a part of belief .... Indonesians are one and the same
people".s4 The preamble to Permi's August 1930 statutes noted that
Indonesia's population was predominantly Muslim, and asserted
that Indonesian Muslims, "basing their struggle on the principle of
Islam and their nationality .... are striving for progress in order to
fight for ltheir] human rights [which] are expressed in their social
order and welfare and dignity".85 In 1931, the return of Muchtar
Luthfi, whose own experience in Cairo had fortified his preference
for national, rather than pan-Islamic solutions, strengthened this in-
tellectual tendency, as well as giving it a powerful new voice.86 "In
our opinion",Ilyas remarked early in 193I, "there is no difference
or conflict between the goals of these two groups. Although they
base [their struggles] on two different principles, they both want
to lead on to direct our people toward the achievement of Progress
and human dignity". The Permi synthesis was the means to end this
"ltagic situation".87
Permi's position attracted sharp and immediate rebuttal.
Muhammadiyah figures like Haji Rasul (whose educational cen-
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tre had given rise to Sumatera Thawalib in the first place)88 and
Hamka, outraged at Permi's reconciling conceptualisation,se saw
Islam as completely providing all necessary elements and thus al-
ready encompassing the concept of nation; to look outside Islam to
nation was itself blasphemous.eo Mohammad Natsir, young disciple
of Hassan, wrote that Permi leaders were not "satisfied with their
Islam. They seem to feel that Islam is not enough, that they deem it
necessary to add [something else]",e1 and argued that such a posi-
tion would mean, in time, that nationalism would assume ascen-
dancy over religion.
Such criticism brought important containment to Permi's think-
ing. Thereafter, Permi leaders stressed that their sole ideological
foundation was indeed Islam-not the nation as such as an end in
itself, as the secularists demanded-and that nationalism provid-
ed merely the arena and the context of the action which belief in
Islam prompted. While Islam and nationalism were not in contra-
diction, indeed, were "like the left and the rightleg" , and while the
God-given attachment to kebangsaan was "inherent in man as the
shadow is to the body",e'Permi resolved at its second congress in
1931 that nationalism was a "way of action" rather than an intel-
lectual pillar. In Luthfi's words, "kebangsaan .... is just a way to
achieving Indonesian independence", ar.d its building a religious
and meritorious work; "with a Free Indonesia we can obtain glori-
ous Islam".e3 Nationalism gave direction and purpose to the task
of human improvement-such as the struggle against feudalism,
imperialism, and capitalism, as well as limiting prqvincialism and
ethno-centrism, and for democracy and the rights and li6eiation
of humans. But it was, in the final analysis, a work carried out in
the name of God and in his service;ea "the Quran says, God does
not change the condition of a people until they change their own
condition".es Independence was the means to the achievement of
these goals-including the primacy of Islam and full commitment
to its teachings, both deemed impossible under colonial rule-but
would not itself necessarily bring them about or even guarantee
their achievement.e6
Permi leaders, then, had attempted to bring together the increas-
ingly fractious streams of Islam and kebangsaan by emphasising
the positive character of both and ignoring the different visions each
had for the future of Indonesia. That stance, of course, involved a
wholesale rejection of the kinds of pan-Islamic thinking still dear to
many PSII figures.eT When challenged by outraged Muslim politi-
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cians, they were forced, their bluff called, to acknowledge that their
politics was framed in fundamentally Islamic terms. A Persis leader,
iccentuating what Permi leaders had earlier attempted to cloud and
divert attention from, wrote that "the kebangsaan movement works
with Indonesian people in the name of 'Mother Indonesia' and for
the sake of the Indonesia marhaen [little people]. The Islamic move-
ment in this country works with the Indonesian Muslims in the
name of Allah and for the independence of Islam".e8 That concise
assessment showed in fact how divergent the Islamist and nation-
alist visions were: the one, to create a state freed from colonialism
whose inhabitants could fashion it as they chose; the other to create
the freedom to install an Islamic state which would be shaped, as
would the lives of its inhabitants, by Islamic ideals, laws, and be-
liefs. The Permi attempt at synthesis was crushed by its inability to
marry those two notions.
Notwithstanding its intellectual defeat, Permi's great practical
success in mobilising nationalism in the cause of Islam and merg-
ing religious attachment with political activism made it the largest
and most popular political party in Sumatra, although it remained
restricted to the regions of Minangkabau, Tapanuli and Bengkulu.ee
"Together with the PSII it strove, "with equal fierceness", to bring
about, as quickly as possible, a "ftee Indonesia".10o It was, indeed,
"the only political party of any significance outside Java", and
the only one with its headquarters in Sumatra, with a member-
ship estimated in mid-1933 at 10,000, of whom "some thousands"
were women-twice PSII's membership in West Sumatra.1o1 That
very success, inevitabl!, made it an important target for Dutch re-
pression and intimidation. The arrests of Permi's major leaders in
Iggg/o2 and the repressive limits the government thereafter placed
on its political and educational activities, forced it to abandon its
political activities the followin g year in favour of meek educational
and social activities, the prestige and capacity of which also rapidly
declined. That stance so weakened the party that it resolved in1936
to disband, being finally wound up in October \937.103
The Jong Islamieten Bond
Permi was not the only site of intellectual contestation over the
relationship of nationalism to religion. The Jong Islamieten Bond
(JIB - Young Muslims' Association), created in 1925 from the Jong
]ava (Young Java) association by Syamsurijal under the sponsorship
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of Salim, grew to a membership of 1000 by the end of 1925 and to
around 4,000 by the early 1930s,10a and became a significant source
of elaborated thinking on that matter.los Its starting point, naturally
enough, was Islam itself, and its goal one of "studying and exactly
observing the usages prescribed by Islam";106 it thought of Islam not
"like an heirloom which hinders progress, no more as a place to
run to because we are afraid of the threat of the hereafter".1O7 Since
"Muslims are brothers",I1s 't was Islam that underlay feelings of
community among the Indonesian people; thus "the national spirit
.... means for the J.I.B.: the spirit of Islam//'10e the organisation's suc-
cess was deemed by its founders to be "ahigh national interest".11o
That sense brought one JiB delegate to disparage nationalism for its
divisive tendencies, comparing it to Islam which "knows no divi-
sions based on nation and contains nothing which stirs up hatred
but by contrast encourages all peoples to mutual appreciation and
understanding". In that sense, then, a notion of the national was a
"luxury item/.111 Others, however, while affirming that Islam pro-
vided the real basis for Indonesian unity-" a unity which is not
based on internal likeness is imperfecl"ttz-u1fl playing down or
denying the apparent conflictbetween Islam and nationalism-1'the
J.I.B. and Indonesian nationalism go hand in hand. This had been
the case right from the beginning//113-moved to improve links with
nationalist-inclined youth and even with Christian youth, a strategy
that was not reciprocated.lla JIB, indeed, was a professedly nation-
al, not regional or ethnic body, and it named its scouting body the
National Indonesian Scout Movement, reflecting something of the
ambivalence of its position.11s All the while, JIB maintained a strong
sense of religious toleration ("Indonesia has many religions .... we
must not force our religion on others who believe differentlf ,but
must work together with them if possible")116 and a fixedly apoliti-
cal position, something nicely manifested by the deployment of its
Dutch-language name. But one indication of its desire for distance
was its refusal to join the fusion of youth groups established inI93L,
Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia) in order to preserve its identity
as a dedicated Muslim group.117
Islam versus nationalism
The threat of secular nationalism to Islamism was not just that it
opposed, in the name of emancipation, some fundamental Islamic
tenets, or even that it criticised the haji as a means to "enrich the
Studia Islamika, Vol. 16, No. 7, 2009
Disunity, distance, disregard: The political failure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 17
Arabs at the cost of [Indonesians'] own land"'118 The problem was
more fundamental, as one PNI leader noted: "the P.N.I' was not
established to involve itself with religious matters/ not even to act
against the laws of Mohammed, but to work to make Indonesia
free".11'e Indeed, one young nationalist activist thought that "there
was no unity in Islam and that people involved in the movement
must set aside Islam".120 That kind of thinking made Muslim lead-
ers fearful, antagonistic and defensive; what might become of Islam
should the nationalists succeed in enthroning the nation? One PSII
member, indeed, expressed the fear that "as soon as 'Indonesia'
falls into the hands of the P.N.I., the Islamic religion will be brought
down".l2l
The Persis leader Hassan opposed the concept of the nation-state
and saw nationalism as a dangerously fissiparous tendency for the
global Muslim community, dividing people one from another rather
thanbringing them together as Muslimbrothers. Indeed, he thought
that "to set up a kebangsaan organization, to invite and persuade
people to join kebnngsaan, to assist akebangsaan Patty, is forbidden in
Islam", indeed a form of apostasy. "IsIarn" , he argued, "orders us to
unite ourselves according to Islam and on the basis of Islam. Islam
obliges us to seek freedom, not on account of happiness or misery,
but in order to realize fully the commandments of Islam in every
respect". 122 Indeed, "to belong to the nationalist party means leav-
ing Islam".123 Haji Rasul thought along similar lines, if not quite so
severely: "1. Islam is tolerant, kebangsaan is not' Thus they contradict
each other and therefore cannot be united. 2' Islam brings peace and
unity to the world, kebangsaan divides the world. 3. Islam embraces
mankind in general, and strengthens the brotherhood of man, even
the tie between Muslims and non-Muslims may not be severed".12a
The controversy reached its most sophisticated form, in ways
that served further to separate the two streams of thinking and to
deepen their differences, in the thinking of the Persis leader Natsir,
expressed in a series of articles in Pembela Islam in 1931 and 1932.
Himself schooled inboth Islamic (informally) and Western styles,l2s
Natsir naturally saw Islam as providing the fundament for nation-
ally-minded thinking in Indonesia: "It was the Islamic movement
which first paved the way in this country for political actions aim-
ing at independence, which first planted the seeds of Indonesian
unity .... which first planted the seed of brotherhood with those of
the same faith outside the boundaries of Indonesia ...' ."126 Islam,
then, the religion of the great majority of Indonesians, provided
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the necessary basis and ground for the archipelago's solidarity and
unity.127 For Muslims, independence would provide "the freedom
of Islam in order that Islamic rules and regulations be realized for
the well-being and perfection of the Muslims as well as of all Allah's
creatures".128 Religiously-neutral nationalists, by contrast, sought to
downplay the importance of Islam and replace it with a basis which
was "vague, and does not meet the requirements we desire".12e Islam
provided not just the foundation for unity but a moral and political
guideline for the new state, "a code for the upholding of ethics ....
for the regulation of man's relations at home, in society, in the gov-
ernance and the state .... the regulation of relations with people of
other faiths .... with people of other countries; which gives guidance
to the fulfilment of the physical and other spiritual needs of man
in order to attain his highest aspirations".13O Natsir did not mince
his words in contrasting his vision for Indonesia with that of the
natiorralists. Kebangsaan, like regional or ethnically based solidarity,
was essentially divisive, self-serving and selfish. Islam, by contrast,
preached altruistic, not competitive, qualities of community: "Islam
plants in the heart of the Javanese, the Sumatrans, the Chinese etc
[the consciousness of ] belonging to the noblest creatures of Allah
.... Only with these teachings can the love of one's people which is
indeed a nature of mankind .... be safeguarded from falling into the
low and intolerant fanaticism of kebangsaarz which teaches: 'in our
interest, in the interest of our needs, we do not care [if we] harm
others'//.131 Responding to the nationalist plea to put religion to one
side, he remarked:
Our aim and purpose are not similar. You seek independence for
Indonesia on accourt of the Indonesian nation, on account of Mother
Indonesia. We struggle for independence because of Allah, for the
well-being of all the inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago .... we go
separate ways!132
Islamist Isolation
The developing clarity and fixity of the Islamist position served
only to isolate it politically. PSII remained the largest political party
in the country, claiming at the end of 7931a membership of around
30,000.133 But the attempt to Islamise the idea of Indonesia circum-
scribed a notion the greatest virtue of which was its broad inclusive-
ness. Islamists thereby distanced themselves from the mainstream of
Indonesian political thinking and refused to engage constructively
Studia Islamikn, Vol. 75, No. 1, 2009
Disunity, distance, disregnrd: The political t'aiture of Islamism ln late colonial Indonesia 79
with the now deeply-anchored popularity of the idea of Indonesia
amongst the educated elite. The simple idea proclaimed by national-
ist leaders-"that only a free Indonesia canbring salvation//1'34-had
found a deep resonance especially with young Western-influenced
elites and even among people who had no deep grasp of the con-
cept or of its implications. They proclaimed that the Indonesia they
sought must be united, notwithstanding differences in ethnicity, re-
ligion and region. "A people who cannot be one are like loose sand,
"*ity blown ipart by the wind" , Sukarno 
asserted; "But if this sand
remains together, and is pressed together into cement, the cement
of the soul, then it can become concrete/ that is, the concrete of that
national will, from which finally national deeds proceed"'13s Even
when the non-cooperating group of parties was finally crushed by
the government-Sukarno, Hatta, and Syahrir arrested and impris-
orr"J, Sukarno repudiating non-cooPeration, the PNI Baru dead
and Partindo dissolving itself in !936136-tlnt idea of Indonesia still
shone brightly and"effectively amongst other parties'
Nationalist leaders were often cruelly dismissive of Islamism's
pretensions, but Sukarno made one of the few efforts to intellectu-
allse the Islam-nationalism problem. Exiled by the Dutch in Endeh,
he expressed in a series of letters to Ahmad Hassan his dismay at
what appeared to him as Islam's lack of dynamism, its reticence to-
wards piogt"tt, modernity and Western knowledge'137 Later, now
exiled elsewhere in Flores, Sukarno, sought to clarify further his
own, and the general nationalist attitude, to the political manifes-
tation of religion. He wrote approvingly of the example of secular
Turkey: "Islim has not been wiped out by Turkey, but Islam has
been given over to the people of Turkey themselves, and not to the
state 
-.. 
For us Islam is a matter for ourselves and not a matter for
the state,,.13s While he accepted the generalised notion of a lived, but
non-institutionalised, relationship between religion as such and the
coming Indonesian 5121g13e-3nd, indeed, hoped that "a11the people
will burn with the fire of Islamz140-his difficulties with the Islamist
political agenda began with Islam itself which he saw, at least in
its extant manifestation, as backward and lacking in important ele-
ments.1a1 He argued that the union of state and religion in a soci-
ety that *u, 
^oi wholly Muslim 
would be fatal for democracy: "for
countries like this there are only two alternatives .... the unity of state
and religion, but without democracy, or democracy, but the state separated
from religiont'/.142 while he found much to praise in Islam's religious
and spiritual message, he found the Islamic claim to political domi-
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nance/ especially if it were expressed through the authority of ula-
ma,ra3 repellent. Equally, Sukarno scorned the weakness of a religion
that would seem to depend so utterly on state sponsorship.laa
In his response to Sukarno, Natsir offered nothing new. He em-
phasised the particularly all-embracing, unsegmented quality of
Islam which saw no division into the divine and secular domains;
earlier he had quoted approvingly Gibb's phrase that Islam was a
"complete civilisation/.14s The state, indeed, had an obligation to
ensure that its subjects followed the prescriptions ordained by God
himself;1a6 "the State, for us, is not an aim but a tool. The affairs of
state are at root one part, one 'integrating part', which cannot be
separated from Islam" .la7 Indeed, "in Islamic statecraft there is abso-
lutely no place for dualism".1a8Islam provided "the basis for regulat-
ing society, the importance and the need for which does not change
while people remain peopls" .tts Islam demanded no specific form of
government, apart from prescribing the need for consultation; Islam
was democratic "insofar as Islam is anti-autocracy, anti-absolutism,
anti-despotism//.150 Parliamentary democracy might be appropriate,
even good, but it had no power to change the essential teaching of
Islam, notwithstanding the popular will. "If indeed a law or an in-
tention of humankind conflicts with the laws and intention of Islam,
the law and intention of God must stand, the law and intention of
humankind must fall".151 State neutrality towards religion simply
d.emonstrated that leaders did not value Islamic princiiles.ls2In an
Islamic state, though, non-Muslims need not be concerned: they en-joy "broad freedom of religion .... With the Laws of Islam in force,
their Religion will not be disturbed, will not be damaged and will
not be diminished in any way".rsz
This interchange is instructive. For Sukarno, religion was essen-
tially a matter of private observation, encouraged perhaps by the
state, but not ordained and controlled by it; such, indeed, threatened
to endanger the integrity and life of the state. For Natsir, the divine
revelation made it incumbent on the state to be informed by and to
implement Islamic law. He saw no salvation through nationalism
as such. That no grounds for compromise could be found suggests
two things: first, that in the context of colonial domination and with
the prospect of freedom apparently distant, the protagonists could
maintain their positions without the incursion of pragmatic reality
upon their thinking. Second, and more specifically, it underlines the
failure of Natsir to think imaginatively about how the practical re-
alities of governance might give him cause to moderate his Islamist
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strictures-if only to provide a sense of greater detail about how an
Islamist government and a regime of Islamic law might respond to
the specific conditions of Indonesian society. As things stood, how-
ever, Islamism saw no need to move; its exclusivism would endure
until pragmatics would much later force at least a partial accom-
modation.
Emerging disunity
By the early 1930s, the PSII's sense of self-privileged mission and
self-importance and consequently its desire for distance from the
Dutch-managed political arena had hardened. S.M. Kartosuwiryo
saw the hijrah policy as a means "to.hold [the partyJ apart and to
establish in Indonesia its own organisation which satisfies the re-
quirements of Islamic society".1sa Aruji Kartawinata, chairman of
the party's Garut (West ]ava) branch, remarked that one goal of
the PSII was to form the youth "in such a way that they are able
to create a society which satisfied the requirements of Islam".155
Abikusno Cokrosuyoso, Cokroaminoto's brother and later party
leader, responded to an attack by Hatta on his proposed agrarian
program by retorting that "society must be organised not according
to Marxist, but according to Islamic collectivismz.ls6 InMay 7934,
Cokroaminoto's "General Regulation for the Islamic Community"
("Reglement umum bagi Ummat Islam") was endorsed by PSII's
20th congress in Banjarnegara.lsT PSII's exclusivism could only have
been strengthened by continuing expressions of anti-Islamic senti-
ment, such as that reported of a Kediri Catholic schoolteacher in 1934
who had encouraged his students to desecrate the Qur'an (resulting
in a protest meeting attended by 4,000 people and the teacher's dis-
missal),1s8 a similar case in Surabaya in the same year,lse and 1937
press articles critical of the Prophet's stance on polygyny, deemed
a consequence of his alleged wantonness.l60 That such things could
happen, remarked one Muslim, was testimony to "the decline of
Islam as a consequence of the indifference of Muslims who .... in-
creasingly ignore Allah and His precepts".161
But PSII's complacent self-satisfaction with its political views
and the range of its duties led to a sense of stagnation ("in gen-
eral the public remains cold";rez which invited internal contestation.
Suryopranoto's efforts to turn around the PSII position, expressed
in his plea for positive self-criticism of the party itself and its leader-
ship at the 1930 conference, had little impact, despite the meeting's
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conclusion that the party faced serious deficiencies in the range of
its branch activity, and problems in its loose financial management,
the excessive and uncritical reverence it accorded its leadersl and its
lack of success in competing with other organisations.l63 sukiman's
disaffection with the PSII's exclusivism, his attachment to the na-
tional aspect of emancipation-at the second psII conference he
spoke of the struggle "for the interests of the Indonesian nation
and the hopes for the freedom of our country and the Islamic reli-
gion"16a-6nd the failure of his efforts to reform and modernise IrsII
policies, procedures and attitudes, finally led to his decision to chart
a new path. His persistence in seeking,like permi, collaborative in-
teraction with the nationalists-evidenced by his invitation to Hatta(rejected by the party) to become joint edito; of the psII newspaper
oetoesan Indonesia-inevitably led to sharp personal conflict with
Cokroaminoto. Both Suryopranoto and S.rki*u.t were expelled
from the PSII in March r913;es an event, pandji rimoer.or,.rr,rd"d,
with "serious consequences for the whole national movement//.166
Djawa Barat asked, in a pointed reference to Cokroaminoto's dicta-
torial grip on the party: "Is the p.s.I.I. the party of cokro or the party
of the people?",167 while party dissidents in Makassar, utnoyla ut
"the manner the leaders_misuse the organisation for their own per-
sonal interests", established their own party.168
Thereafter, sukiman and his supporters considered the possi-bility of establishing themselves as permi branches, but ultimately
decided to form a new pafty, the Indonesian Isramic partv (partai
Islam Indonesia 
- Parii) in June 1933. The new party was firmly based
upon Islam-its leaders thought that "purifying society in general
and 'Indonesian' society in particular is possible onlv if GoJ,s will
is observed'/16e-and upon non-coop"rutio.r, and sought alliance,
and perhaps even unity, with nationalists in the causetf indepen-
dence.170 It saw the need, as psII often did not, to follow an aggres-
sively activist political program. sukiman saw in Islam and Muslim
law the means to rescue humanity from division and turmoil: ,,All
laws made by a group are especially for the interests of that group
and thus disadvantage others. But Islam is a law drafted by iod, is
not for the sake of personal interests and disadvantages no one, in-
deed, it promotes the good". He also saw the contemp--orary practice
of Islam as skewed; "what is wrong with Muslimr 
"nr."nity is thatthey are only interested in the little things such as celebrations, while
no thought is given to the major goal of rslam// .171' Hopes for closer
collaboration with Permi and even JIB-"thereby possibly to arrive
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at the establishment of a large modern Islam parfy"-evaPorated
with the government's repression of Permi. But Sukiman's new
party,notwithstanding its emphasis on political activity, gained no
popular traction, and disappeared within a year'172 However, his
ictions were a serious and damaging reproof to the PSII's sense of
self-satisfied withdrawal from serious political involvement'
The departure of Sukiman and Suryopranoto did not heal the
PSII's problems of strategy and personality;r73 Soeara Oemoem
thoughi the party out-of-date, poorly led, and badly in need of new
leadership.lTa Shortly thereafter, Salim, an "outstanding leader" re-
nowned for "his intellect, his great oratorical skills, his many years
of experience in the political movement and .... the power of his
speciil personality" ,t'5 r.rrarrifested his own increasing doubts about
the pariy's exclusivist and self-regarding attitudes, and especially
about the hijrah policy. By the mid-1930s, he had adopted the view
that the PSII had to abandon its exclusionism and embrace collabo-
ration with other parties and even with the colonial government.lT6
His thinking may have been influenced by suggestions that he might
be proposed for a seat in the Volksraadl'77-!is opponents certainly
thought him a slave to his ambitionlT8-as well as his testy relation-
ship with Cokroaminolo,lTe but he must also have come to realise
that the hijrah policy was in many respects counterproductive and
even potentially fatal given the government's dangerously lepres-
sive mood, especially aftet 1933.180 As things stood, Salim argued,
the hijrah policy achieved nothing except to isolate the party from
playing an effective role in politics.181 As he later remarked, "we
hoped to get a podium or a platform in the volksraad in order to
propot" various changes which would improve the situation of the
people" .182 Through the hijrah policy, his supporters averred,," aPo-
iitical party is turned into a party for Qur'an reading and religious
ptopugu^da etc. etc."183 and, Salim remarked, "increasingly drifts
awiy from the political arena to a world of visions where there
is no place for any social action".18a Such distancing and quietude
meant, as well, that there was little sense of deeply-rooted activism.
A Dutch political survey remarked in 1936, lhat "a socio-religious
association such as the Muhammadiyah, which does constructive
work in the interests of the people, has greater drawing power with
the masses than a politico-religious organisation like the PSII, which
mainly contents itself with proclaiming hollow slogans and fruitless
mutual quarrelling".185
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Salim's failure to convince his party of the need for change and en-
gagement stiffened an already tense relationship with Abikusno,186
head of the party's executive committee following Cokro's death,
who maintained that "it is clear that the glory and nobility of the
Islamic community is found through the Hijrah".187 Towards the
end of 1936,Salim created an internal group, the "Barisan Penyadar
PSII" (The Front of the Aware PSII) to campaign for his ideas, re-
plete with numerous branch-level committees.l88 In consequence,
"in numerous branches the members are divided into two camps,
the one supporting the current administration and its hijrah prin-
ciple, while the other rallies to the side of H.A. Salim-.18e The re-
sult was catastrophic for Salim's hopes, with Abikusno relentlessly
favouring the hijrah policy. Salim, and those around him, who in-
cluded such notables as A.M. Sangaji and the young law student
Mohammed Rum, were expelled from the PSII early in1937.|eu
Salim then moved to create the Barisan Penyadar as a sepa-
rate, cooperative ("striving to realise its ideals in cooperation with
the Covernmenl")le1 partf , now renamed Pergerakan Penyadar
(Movement of the Aware). It aimed to establish a parliamentary
form of democracy,\e2 and to establish itself as a champion of the
popular will,1e3 but the movement attracted little interest; "it ap-
peared to be a club too much tied to Salim/.1e4 The open meetings at
Penyadar's first congress attracted only around fifty people,les and
only a few local PSII branches, apparently disaffected by the uncom-
promising hijrah policy especially championed by Kartosuwiryo.le6
Moreover, PSII leaders, embittered by Salim's behaviour-"while
Cokroaminoto was still alive, Salim did not have the courage to in-
cite discord in the party"le7-gave the new party no respite, pre-
venting, as we shall see, Penyadar's involvement in the more collab-
orative politics of the late 1930s. Salim seemed to be, one newspaper
averred, "aleadet without followers",les and the party struggled to
articulate a clear sense of aims and purpose, not to mention a plan
of action. Its increasing marginalisation was reflected in Salim's fail-
ure to be named to the Volksraad in1939.1ee
For their part, Sukiman and his colleagues, having toyed with
overtures offered them to rejoin the PSII,200 determined to re-estab-
Iish the old Parii under the name Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian
Islamic Party - PII) in December 1938. It was loosely based around
the Islam Study Club, a group of Muslim intellectuals established in
Yogyakarta on the initiative of Muhammadiyah chair Mas Mansur,
rejected the ideas of party discipline and non-cooperation,20l and
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foreswore purely social action in favour of politics-"each Muslim,
according to the teaching of our religion, is obliged to move into
the political terrain .... our whole way of life and everything we do
is a function of politics. Politics is a means to power".202 It made its
goals clear in its statutes: "to make the Indonesian people ready to
accept the absolute position of Islam and its followers, a goal they
try to achieve by the closer invocation of the brotherly connection
between Muslims and their associations and by bringing to the peo-
ple the realisation of their right to regulate their lives according to
the prescriptions of Islam-.203 PII's deliberate focus on politics as a
means of enhancing Islamic interests was a reflection of its antipa-
thy towards Muslim political quiescence; it lamented that while the
nationalists busily involved themselves in politics, "one hears and
notes virtually nothing from the Muslim community, at least not in
proportion to its numbers".204 PII was equally adamantly opposed
to the exclusiveness of bodies like PSII. The new party was to be "a
torch, which enlightens the Muslim world, calling upon and urging
the whole Muslim community in Indonesia to get involved in the
political terrairr", even if it endured some early tensions concerning
" 
the relative weight to be given to Islam as against nationalism.20s
Its chair was Wiwoho Purbohadqoyo,'ou member of the Volksraad
(sometimes thought of, indeed, as that chamber's only Muslim rep-
resentative, to the chagrin of Muslims who called for an increase
in their representation),2]7 and its leadership included Sukiman
himself and the Cairo-educated Abdulkahar Muzakkir. The party
was particularly fortunate in attracting the support of Mansur, who
had pushed Muhammadiyah more strongly into an activist stance
by proclaiming at the 1938 Muhammadiyah congress his organisa-
tion's willingness to pursue collaboration with political parties,208
and who became himself a PII member and leader. Partly as a con-
sequence of these strategic appointments and contacts, the party
quickly began to develop, even in the Outer Islands; by mid-1939 it
had around sixty branches and by early 79401'15.20e PII's disciplined
intellectual approach to politics produced a clear political agenda by
\940, which saw Indonesia as a unitary state with democratic par-
liamentary institutions-"indeed the religion of Islam obliges us to
support with all our strength the demands of the Indonesian people
for a proper parliament/l2L0-at both central and regional level, its
citizens with rights of free expression and thought, a state-centred
economic system which aimed at the protection and advancement
of indigenous entrepreneurs/ Islam left free to manage its own af-
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fairs, an ending to state subsidies to all religions, and opposition to
the notion of a native mi1itia.211
PSII: an end to Exclusivism
The PSII maintained its virulent opposition towards cooperation
following Salim's departure. For Abikusno, "much association with
'kafirs', as well as taking a seat in the representative councils to-
gether with 'kafirs', is not good and contravenes the orders of God.
If the P.S.I.I. were in the future to embrace the cooperative principle
this would be .... a sin against God'/.21'2 Such rhetoric was under-
pinned by reference to the difficulties the Prophet himself faced in
his original hijrah.213 But the political utility of the party's exclusiv-
ism was now increasingly under question. While the PSII remained
the biggest political party in the Indies, with an estimated member-
ship of between 40,000 and 50,000 members in the mid-1930s, it was
plagued by chronic division and long-term institutional difficulties
of a financial and disciplinary kind.21a More immediately important
was its deepening awareness of the political ineffectiveness its non-
cooperation policy had brought it. One newspaper remarked that
the party had "left the field of political action .... and become 'non-
dangerous"',"5 while the dissident Sabirin argued that non-coop-
eration "is worthwhile only if the political party concerned is pow-
erful enough to achieve its goal by 'extra-parliamentary' means.
However, non-cooperation is pointless and even damaging and
dangerous for the movement if a politicalparty thereby wholly cuts
out avenues for further action, as is currently the case. Further,by
maintaining a non-cooperation standpoint, the P.S.I.I. isolates itself
more and more from other parties and from society".216
Accordingl/, the PSII, while it remained entrenched in its non-
cooperation policy with the government, began to reorient its at-
titude to other parties and groups, something partly occasioned by
increasing Muslim resentment at persistent government interfer-
ence in the religious arena, such as a proposed new marriage ordi-
rrarrce,2l7 a 1937 regulation which moved the treatment of matters
of inheritance from the religious to the regular court system,218 //llne
insults which have been done in recent times to Muslims",21e and
perhaps as well the continuing misery caused by the Depression
and gathering international tensions.22o
One aspect of that more ecumenical mood was the lifting of the
expulsion placed on Sukiman and his supporters in July 1937.221 In
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that same month, the PSII congress, at which there was talk of a
"Muslim brotherhood",222 embraced the notion of developing an
Islamic Congress along the lines of the Al-Islam congress last held
five years before. It was eventually held in Surabaya in February
1938-the tenth such Congress, by PSII reckoning-with twenty-
five Islamic organisations attending, although/ as in times past, the
traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (which claimed 67,000 mem-
bers by 1935),22s having sent a delegation, withdrew from the conl
gress because of doctrinal disagreements and the manner in which
PSII dominated proceedings.22a The congress was intended to bring
together all Muslim associations to work together and to mediate
disputes within the Islamic community, to develop closer relations
with Muslim communities overseas, to work for the welfare of
Islam and the Muslim community, and to establish an Indonesian
Muslim Congress. It made determinations to opPose Dutch plans to
change marriage law and the making of insults against the Prophet
and Islam generally, and on various points of Islamic ritual, on im-
proving hajj travel, and even on supporting the Muslim community
of Palestine.22s A further Al-Islam congress was held in Solo in May
1939, and another in Solo in July 1941, which made important deci-
sions regarding the form of the state, the problem of an Indonesian
militia, and on blood transfusions.226 The congress now counted
amongst its numbers 14 ordinary members, T extraordinary ones,
and another 7 candidate organisations; all the major Muslim organi-
sations, including PSII, PII, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and
NU were involved.227 It was treated to a rousing speech from Wahid
Hasyim on the need for Muslim unity: "a watch is one, because each
wheel likes and wishes to be united; whether it is a big wheel or a
small one, whether it turns to the left or to the right, whether it has
springs or not, all of them like and want to be united .... One for all
and all for one. Is the Indonesian Islamic community prepared to be
like that?"228
A further concrete result of the PSII's partial abandonment of its
exclusivism was its participation in the MIAI (A1-Madjlisul-Islamil-
A'laa Indonesia 
- 
Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia), estab-
lished in Septemb er 1937 in Surabaya as a consultative federation
of Muslim organisations on the initiative of Muhammadiyah's Mas
Mansur, NU's Ahmad Dahlan Kebondalem and Abdul Wahab, as
well as PSII's Wondoamiseno. That combination was itself a sign of
a more highly cooperative attitude amongst Muslim organisations,
notwithstanding PSII's pointed refusal to countenance the admis-
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sion of Salim's Penyadar.22e PSII soon formed the MIAI's core/ and
the able Wondoamiseno spearheaded its administration. The MIAI's
goals were framed in terms of strengthening the bonds between
Muslim organisations, defending Islam from attack, and promoting
ties between Muslims both inside and outside the country.230 While
the MIAI, numbering seven organisations after its foundation (but
not NU, which joined the body only in late 1940),231 formally lim-
ited its considerations to religious matters, "the boundary between
Islam and politics was difficult to draw" .232
In October \937,P9IJ announced that although "the P.S.I.L has for
a considerable time in its activities held itself aside from the nation-
al movements", it had come to the conclusion that "such separation
appears to be less useful for the 'Indonesian' people's movement in
general". Accordingly, it had determined to reconnect "in order to
work together with the national movements" .233 By the end of 1937,
an initiativo by Abikusno with Sutomo's Parindra had resulted in
the idea of an Indonesian National Congress, "a place for consulta-
tion by the whole people".23a That collaboration was " a symptom of
the inclination for cooperation between a religious political group
and a pure nationalist one".235 Sutomo himself remarked on "the
good understanding and cooperation which now exists between
Parindra and other parties, for example, the Indonesian People's
Movement (Gerindo) and the Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party".236
It was itself a consequence of the dire political situation in which
the general Indonesian movement had found itself in its quest for
an independent Indonesia.237 It was formalised in April-1938 as
Badan Perantaraan Partai-partai Politik Indonesia (Liasion Board
of Indonesian Political Parties - Bapeppi), and included as well the
staunchly secularist Gerindo and the ethnically-based West Java as-
sociation Pasundan; each of the four parties "represent[ing] a spe-
cific group or stream".238 Bapeppi sought "the development of co-
operation between the Indonesian PoliticalParties";23e as Abikusno
remarked, "the nation must be educated in the idea of working to-
gether".2a0 But Bapeppi, while it was open to non-indigenous organ-
isations (unlike the old PPPKI), was rent by jealousies and fears; it
enjoyed little success and lasted less than a year.2al Moreover, there
were still voices within the PSII which championed exclusivism;
one PSII party leader in Palembang remarked that "the political,
economic and social hijrah means that this party will have nothing
to do with anything which is not in accord with the regulations of
Islam given in the Qt)t'ar." .242
Studia Islamikn, Vol. 16, No. 1,2009
Disunity, distance, disregard: The political failure of Islamism in late colonial Indonesia 29
Another and more successful effort at mutual engagement saw
the appearance of a federation of parties, Gapi (Gabungan Politik
Indonesia 
- 
Indonesian Political Federation) in May 1939, with its
stated aim to create a responsible parliamentary form of government
for the Indies.2a3 Its emergence signalled even more strongly that
the old issue of cooperation or non-cooperation had sagged in rel-
evance, especially given the increasingly threatening international
situation and the emerging, slight, possibility that the Dutch might
be amenable to cooperating in incremental reform, notably the for-
mation of a responsible parliament for the Indies.2af Gapi included
the four major parties-notwithstanding Salim's reservations that
such an alliance would restrain the political freedom of Muslim par-
ties2as-as well as PII, Persatuan Minahasa (Minahasa Union), and
Persatuan Politiek Katholiek Indonesia, but non-indigenous organi-
sations were not permitted to join. Gapi was not intended to pursue
ideological unification, but rather "unity of action in matters which
are thought important from the point of view of the community and
which the community needs'{.246 Its aim, as expressed in its statutes,
was "to implement the ideals of the Indonesian people".2a7
The PSII was an especially strong supporter of the notion of a
parliament.2as In Abikusno's view, "Islam teaches that the world was
created for [humankind's] wellbeing, and because 'Indonesians'
did not yet possess this wellbeing, it could be achieved through
a parliamerrt".24e At the "Congress of the Indonesian People"
(Kongres Rakyat Indonesia) established by Gapi,250 Wondoamiseno
expressed his hope "for thE speedy establishment of an Indonesian
parliament".2sl At the same time Sukiman claimed democracy as
a Muslim concept; "the government desired by Islam is a govern-
ment which accords with deliberation, which does not depend on
the wish of a single group, much less a single individual",252 aview
which accorded with Salim's earlier explanation that "the democra-
cy of Islam is not the Western kind of one-half plus one but that they
who come to do the work for it have the right and therefore the re-
sponsibility and bear power".2s3 The Congress, establishing itself as
a permanent body under the aegis of Gapi, declared its goal as "the
welfare and prosperity of the Indonesian people" and its method
of decision as majority vote democracy.2sa The parliamentary idea,
naturally, did not enjoy the support of the Dutch goverrunent, ever
more convinced of Indonesian political and social immaturity.zss
As Syahrir had already observed, "the Dutch and the Indonesians
... have only learned to distrust each other//.2s6 Further, it saw the
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emergence of another Islamist contrarian, Kartosuwiryo, whose
contradiction of the PSII's newly engaged approach to politics, and
especially its participation with non-Muslim parties in the push for
an Indonesian parliament, and perhaps as well his idiosyncratic
mystical leanings,led to his estrangement from the party and then
his expulsion, together with his close associates, in January 1939. 7
Pandjilslam asserted that "a ner / time has dawned, the time of co-
operation between the Islamic movement and the Covernment".2s8
Indeed, the MIAI was becoming an ever more influential player
in politics as it cast itself as the representative body of definitive
Muslim sentiment in relation td the government and the channel
for the government's communications regarding Islamic affairs.2se
By September 1940, the MIAI comprised seventeen member organi-
sations; even the Indonesian-Malayan student association in Cairo
was a probationary member.260 Late in1939, Wondoamiseno issued
a demand for an "Indonesian parliament on the basis of Islam",z't
a notion adopted by the MIAI in JuIy 1.947.26'zThe 1940 PSII con-
gress in Palembang was of a similar mind, asserting the notion that
an appropriate parliament was one which "produces the greatest
benefits and advantages for the Indonesian Muslim community
and which meets the desires of society".263 Further, the support of
Muhammadiyah and NU for a Muslim parliament represented "an
enormous step away from political neutrality".26a Early in L941 the
MIAI sought from Gapi recognition of its centrality and authority in
things Islamic, and even an acknowledgement that Indonesia was
"a Muslim Iand".265
MIAI's April 1941 support for Gapi's memorandum to the
Dutch-instituted Visman Commission on political reform, however,
was qualified, since "the popular representation proposed by Gapi
is in various respects not sensitive to the principles of Islam relat-
ing to statecraft .... the largest part of the society, in this case the
Muslim community, would not be represented in appropriate ways
in this parliament".266 Al the very least, Muslim support involved
the notion that within such a parliament Muslims would be domi-
nant, with a Muslim as head of state, and at least two-thirds of the
ministry comprising Muslims, with a dedicated Ministry for Islamic
affairs, and the addition of a crescent to the flug.'u'MIAI's demands
caused an uproar in nationalist ranks, given their potential to dam-
age Gapi's case-Wondoamiseno was absent through illness at the
MIAI meeting which had made that determination-but the cleav-
age was papered over by subsequent declarations on both sides
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that there was no difference in meaning, while MIAI declared that
it was not intervening in politics. Within Muslim ranks, Abikusno
and Wondoamiseno, deeply concerned at the injury inflicted on
Gapi's unity, emphasised the slightness of the difference with Capi.
Abikusno, indeed, remarking that he did not agree with the MIAI
proposals, thought that "people must first strive to obtain a parlia-
ment and leave until later the discussion of how the parliament will
work. If we talk now about details there will be no agreement, since
each association had its own point of view/l .268 In the end, following
robust discussion, t]ne 1941' MIAI conference confirmed its earlier
support for a fu1l parliament based on Islamic principles, and left
the MIAI council to draft a document on how such a parliament
might operate.26e
By contrast, the PII, maintaining a cooperationist stance as cir-
cumstances dictated, "struggling by means of the ideologies of Islam
and nationalisrr.",2To and in ever deepening competition with PSII
(whose membership was estimated by the government at around
only L2,000 members by the end of 1940),271took a more emphatic
and unqualified position on Muslim political suPremacy.2T2That ap-
proach may in part have been a component of PII's gathering at-'
tempts to usurp PSII dominance within the MIAI'273 Other members
groups within MIAI were concerned that MIAI had overstepped its
formal apolitical stance.2Ta That issue was addressed at aJlune 194L
MIAI meeting, where Wondoamiseno remarked that MIAI had not
changed its position, "which remains based on Islamism". In Islam,
he explained, there were provisions relating to every realm, relating
both to the present world and to the world hereafter: "Islam gives
rules relating to politics, education, marriage, inheritance, ttade,
war, and so on. It is therefore inaccurate to assert that Islam pro-
vides rules only for serving God .... People should not be puzzled
that a Muslim organisation from time to time moves into the politi-
cal sphere".27s
In the end, though, PSII's efforts to maintain good relations
with Gapi came to nothing. Gapi's attempt in the Majelis Rakyat
Indonesia (Indonesian People's Council - MRI), a kind of proto-
Indonesian parliament formed in Septembet 194L to develop a
democratic front with the Dutch in the event of war in the Pacific,
was too much for PSII to bear, and resulted in fierce attacks on those
nationalist leaders, Sartono and Sukarjo, who, in the eyes of PSII
leaders, had exceeded their authority in asserting.their loyalty to the
colonial government.2T6 Gapi's refusal to reconsider its position re-
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sulted in the PSll-perhaps more indifferent than Westernised sec-
ular intellectuals to the challenge of fascism and disappointed at the
small fruits of its collaboration-leaving Gapi and, indeed, the MRI,
in December 1941,. The MIAI and PII supported PSII's position, but
did not take their leave. The break was only sharpened when the
goverrunent invited the MRI for talks, at which Islamist politicians
were not represented.2TT These feelings of disenchantment, coupled
with the anticipation of a Japanese victory, pushed the PSII back to
its old non-cooperative position with regard to the Dutch.278
Nonetheless, the most striking aspect of Islamist political action
towards the end of the 1930s was its vigorous embrace of main-
stream politics as a means of advancing its interests. The Dutch
themselves were at least superficially conscious of this turn, not-
ing that "religious consciousness has constantly strongly expanded
in recent years" and "the continuing strrJggle against statements in
word and in writing which are deemed insulting to Islam".27e The
Dutch thought that the Muslim community had gained in self-con-
fidence, that Muslims had become "more aggressive", and more
"intolerant through an increasing sense of identity in both religious
and political spheres".28o But how far had Islamism come both in
defining its core values and in pressing them politically?
The meaning and limits of Islamism
Dutch scepticism about the religious core of Islamist politics ("re-
ligious slogans .... are nothing other than means to move towards
the goal: bringing down Dutch authority")281 seriously underesti-
mated the significance of a distinctive, carefully cultivated Islamic
identity and discourse and a growing Islamist conviction. Since the
PSII had first specifically adopted Islamism in the early and mid-
1920s, some slow progress had been made in clarifying just what
the concept meant and what its implications might be. All Islamists
agreed that Islam should function as a centrally determining aspect
of the state apparatus. For the Sumatran PSII leader Datuk Singo
Mangkuto, "the Islamic religion is the religion of Allah. For this rea-
son, no single temporal power can dominate it// .282 The blunt funda-
mentalist kaum muda figure Haji Rasul-"a passionate, puritanical
teacher"z83-saw his ideal society as one in which human law was
wholly based upon and was consonant with the law of God, and
which drew its legitimacy from that fact, even though he recognised
the political reality of Dutch dominance and sought as best he could
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to inject an Islamic sensibility into political discourse.2sa Less nu-
anced was the view of the Persis figure Sabirin, who thought that
Muslims were "forbidden to honor 'homeland' and flag .... forbid-
den to follow a nationalist cause The PSII's Sangaji saw the
task in terms of the establishment " of a society regulated by the will
of God" .286 Penyadar stated in its principles that "matters concern-
ing society and the state, as well as the place and the lives of each
individual therein, should be regulated in accordance with the prin-
ciples and main features in the laws and prescriptions of the Islamic
religion and avoiding all things which contravene them".287 That
was because "the [Mustim] religious system is the best system for
the general wellbeing".2s8 For Cokroaminoto, "the teachings of the
Qur'an sufficiently cover everything relating to man's needs and re-
quirements, in other words, they are sufficient to provide the basis
for our actions."28e Further, "the Qur'an and hadith are sufficient to
be used as the basis or comPass for all laws which we need to make,
so that we can lead the kingdom (state) to the goal: to make every
person as happy as possible in himself, and to make each person to
the fullest extent possible useful to the community as a whole and
for all of humankind by means of developing physical skills and
spiritual good works-.2eO Already in \931,, noted Wondoamiseno,
the PSII congress had refined and clarified its program "so as to
create a P.S.I.I. ideal or ideology in shaping an Islamic State in ac-
cord with the teachings of the Prophet and according to the orders
of God contained in the Qur'an".2e1 According to the PII's Wali Al-
Fatah, "there are sufficient regulations in Islam which provide for
all the needs of society, the highest as well as the lowesf" '2e2
To achieve the desired goal Islamist political parties sought to
deepen Islam's hold on Indonesian society. For Cokroaminoto,
PSII's aim was "to put Islam into effect as widely and as fully ns pos-
sible, so that we can obtain a genuine World of Islam".2e3 For Hassan,
it was the duty of Muslims to "emphasise Islam-ness in a country
governed by foreigners in order to obtain the broadest freedom, so
to be able to implement Islamic laws".2oa
How that might be achieved was a matter of considerable and
sometimes angry dispute. Some Muslims like Mas Mansur empha-
sised the need for personal devotion and attachment to Islamic fun-
damentals as the means for emancipation, self-improvement and
self-strengthening.2es His organisation, Muhammadiyah, did not see
a necessary connection between Muslim political dominance and
the establishment of an Islamic state; rather, it sought the develop-
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ment of an Islamic society, a society in which Muslim precepts and
values were dominant and would as a matter of course eventually
guide state policy and the making of laws. Thereby an Islamic state
would inevitably develop.2e6 Fachruddin al-Kahiri was similarly fo-
cussed on religious seriousness as the means to freedom: "so long as
the Muslims of Indonesia consider Indonesian freedom as more im-
portant than the freedom of all Muslims, consider politics as more
important than worship .... exchange obedience to the religious
scholar for obedience to the [national] leader .... consider emotions
more important than examination of substance .... and consider the
enemies endangering Indonesian freedom more important than the
enemies who endanger Islam .... so long will Indonesian freedom
remain only a phrase on the lips".'o' But for others like Sukiman,
the explicit practice of politics was deeply important in their mis-
sion; it was not enough to pray and to perform good works, one
had.actively to participate in politics and to seek the political ends
which the full message and implementation of Islam demanded.
To Sukiman, Muslims bore responsibility to take an active part in
the work of striving "for the progress of Indonesia and its people" ,
and he lamented their characteristic political passivity and politi-
cal ignorance which, he claimed, had led to their weakened condi-
tion.2e8 Similarly, in order to realise his aim of establishing a "United
Islamic Community", Cokroaminoto spoke of the necessity first of
creating "a Croup (Party) which is not continually discordant and
divided".2ee The PSII program emphasised the obligation of politi-
cal activity, with its "goal of obtaining the freedom of Muslims"
and the creation of "a favourable and secure Muslim kingdom in
Indonesia".3oo
The gradual and sometimes reluctant embrace by Islamist organi-
sations of the idea of Indonesia had become, for the most part, a thing
of the past. By the late 1,920s, it had become evident to most Islamists
that the fate of Islam was now inextricably tied to Indonesia's des-
tiny; the key to achieving their goals was Indonesian independence,
which would truly free all the people from slavery of every kind-
as long as that freedom was based upon Islam.301 Pembela Islam ar-
gued that "national freedom is what the Islam-movement needs
more than anything else/.302 Kartosuwiryo thought in1932, that "as
long as the Netherlands government existed, people cannot follow
the prescriptions of Islam/.303 In that sense, the 1930s had brought
a significant clarification from an earlier position which had given
pride of place to a notional Islamic community rather than a spe-
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cific national identity. One Muslim, PerPlexed that "in the midst of
this holy war [against colonialism] a group of 'ulamd 'have risen uP
forbidding patriotism and making war on patriots in the name of
the Islamic religion and its doctrines",3oa even sought the opinion of
the revered Rashid Rida. He responded that "the type of patriotism
that should adorn a Muslim youth is that he be a good example of
the people of the homeland, no matter what their religious affilia-
tion, cooperating with them in every legitimate action for indepen-
dence", while reminding him that "he is a member of a body greater
than his people, and his personal homeland is part of the homeland
of his religious community. He must be intent on making the prog-
ress of the part a means for the progress of the whole'.3os The old
tension between ummat and nation was ebbing, if not completely
erased. Both NU and Muhammadiyah judged that participation in
war to defend the Dutch-ruled Indies could not be countenanced
as holy war in defence of Islam.306 In similar vein, the MIAI ruled
that Muslim Indonesians should not provide blood transfusions for
soldiers wounded in such awar.3o7
Islamists remained generally uncertain and confused about how
, independence, once obtained, might be organised. Cokroaminoto,
according to Wondoamiseno, had been convinced that "our State
and nation will be unable to achieve a just and prosPerous life, a
secure and peaceful society while social justice according to Islamic
teachings are not yet in force or implemented to become law in our
state, even if we are independent.//308 But most Islamist organisations
recognised the need for freedom of religious practice. Penyadar ar-
gued that since faith was a gift from God, it was not something that
could be forced. Accordingly, "in society and the regulations of the
state, every person's freedom of religion must be acknowledged, as
long as thereby no intrusion is made on the freedom of others or the
general good customs or the order and the Peace of the country".3oe
That freedom, however, carried with it an obligation for Muslims to
form organisations "to expand knowledge and science and for the
regulation of social life, such as this is desired by Islam for all the
people in the whole world/.310 More broadly, PSII proclaimed an
essential equality in humankind "in society and in law" ,ztt which in-
cluded an acknowledgement of the equal value of believers, wheth-
er male or female,312 and equality of rights in marriage.313 That view,
however, did not prevent PSII from threatening that, upon indepen-
dence, the Dutch, together with Chinese and Arabs, would be expa-
triated.3la PII's attitude to non-Muslims was negotiable, as ZainaI
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Abidin Ahmad explained: "Provided they and their organisations
do no damage to the interests of Islam and the Islamic community,
our attitude towards them is naturally good. Where that is possible,
we work together with them. But if they harm those interests, then
they become our unconditional enemies and they will encounter
positive and serious opposition'/.315 But Ahmad Hassan was unsym-
pathetic to non-Muslim Indonesians who wanted a neutral basis for
the state: "Is it proper that because of 10% of the population, we
wipe out the interests of 90oh of the population?".316
There was uncertainty as well about the political machinery and
policies of an independent Indonesian Islamic state. While Natsir
remained agnostic about the particular political form that Islamism
might inhabit, there was broad general attachment to the notion of
democracy as an integral aspect of Islam.317 Cokroaminoto thought
that "the free country (Indonesia) which PSII is attempting to bring
about must be democratic, as is stated in the Qur'an".318 Indeed,
Cokroaminoto saw the referendum as a tool for parliament to keep
the will of the people at the forefront, "to strengthen the influence of
the People on the parliament, so that parliament continually devel-
ops in response to the will of the People".31e The Perserikatan Ulama
(Ulamas' Association) based its call for a parliament on Qur'anic
teaching.32o MIAI, as we have seen, supported the Gapi move for a
responsible parliament.32l Connecting democracy with anti-colonial-
ism, Abikusno remarkedinl94I, that "the striving of democracy to-
wards an international community of free peoples can .... be achieved
only by the abolition of colonial relationships" .zzz Penyadar claimed
"Islam and democracy" as its basis,323 and Salim spoke of the need
for local grassroots parliaments.32a But a lack of clarity and precision
about how a democratic system and popular sovereignty might ac-
commodate the normative demands of Islam endured.325 There was
uncertainty about the role an Indonesian government might play in
promoting Islam, just as there were differences about how Islamic
fundamentals might be deployed in such a state. Muhammadiyah,
for example, saw Islam as providing a broad guide to the making of
. law, and "rejected formal jurisprudential law codes as proposed by
the traditionalist Muslims//.326 There was more clarity on the future
nature of the economy. Islamism generally opposed the capitalist
system. According to Cokroaminoto, "the wickedness of capitalism
which acts violently and powerfully in our Land has clearly been the
cause of our nation losing its freedom, falling into the humiliation of
'national slavery' and the humiliation of 'the slavery of poverty"' .327
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Salvation was a function of the creation of a government-sponsored
economy, "fully suPervised by the People, the whole based upon
the foundation of Islam".328
Conclusion
Through the decade or so immediately before the outbreak of
World War II, Indonesian Islamism endured a tumultuous period,
characterised by fierce internal competition over strategy and fol-
lowings, as well as the manifestation and exacerbation of deep sus-
picion and discord between Islamism's view of the political future
and that of the secularist champions of the idea of Indonesia. "There
could never be a political stream as powerful and vehement as a
politico-Islamic movement",' remarked one Indonesian in 1939.32e
True in theory, perhaps, but in the circumstances of Indonesia in the
late colonial period, Islamism was characterised more by weakness
than strength. It struggled to accommodate the attraction of the idea
of Indonesia with its pan-Islamic imaginings, but found itself com-
pelled to attempt the task in order to retain its relevance. It fought
unrelentingly against what it often saw as nationalists' blasphe-
mous privileging of the Indonesian nation over Islam. It was racked
by division, notably when the PSII's hijrah policy and a more gen-
eral reluctance to cooperate with other political groups caused the
departure of strong and able leaders like Sukiman and Salim.
There had been some advance, despite Islamism's division and
the fact that it remained on the back foot in relation to the efforts
of the secular nationalists (themselves sorely weakened by Dutch
repression), In the last part of the 1930s, most Islamists had aban-
doned the pretentions to exclusivity which had so deeply wounded
their capacity to make a political mark, and began a Process of col-
laboration with other political forces which aimed to accelerate the
process of achieving Indonesia's freedom.
Overall, however, Islamism remained marginalised within the
general and dominant discourse of nation. That outcome was a result
of the fact that Islamism could find no meaningful compromise with
the proponents of the simple idea of Indonesia. It could agree that
Indonesia must be free from colonial domination, but Islamism's
sense of what that might mean remained a central source of dis-
putation with the nationalists. Islamism sought a free Indonesia in
which Islam would be the political and legal compass; that central
fact found no sympathy with and often fierce opposition from those
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who sought to shape a new Indonesia according to their own non-
Islamic agendas.
It could have been different. The Islamist message was heavily
tinged with religious idealism. Cokroaminoto remarked that ..we
believe with all our being in the establishment of a Kingdom of
Islam in Indonesia, where oui community can live in happiiess and
glory".330 As Taufik Abdullah has suggested, that idealism distract-
ed Islamists from the difficult task of negotiating a more pragmatic
domain for Islam in a new Indonesia.331 Islamists foundit i,,'ror-
sible to temper their moral and political demands to what might
have been more generally acceptable and achievable in a society
renowned for its internal social and religious differences. A major
problem throughout was the fact that Islamism's major political ve-
hicle, the PSII, spent much of the decade in internal ,un"or. because
it adopted a politics of distance from both government and other
political actors that left it estranged from the demands of politi_
cal combat and thus politically impoverished. An earlier und 
-o.uenthusiastic engagement with the idea of Indonesia and its propo-
nents might have forced Islamism not to seek solace ln stutrtrirn
defensiveness but to strive for a form of pragmatic compromise
with the secular nationalists. That, of course, would have required
thoughtful, courageous and more detailed and expansive analysis
of the political implications of Islamism, and how-they might bet-
ter be accommodated in an imagined nation inhabited by dlfferent
peoples of different systems of belief.
Thgt did not happen. when the Japanese arrived in Java early in
1942, rslamism was internally more unified and purposeful than it
had been a decade before. But it was no more capable of managing
its differences with its political competitors than it had ever beery
and no further advanced in the search for a practical solution to
the problem of how Islam might best be manifested in the political
institutions of an independent Indonesia in ways that did not in-
vite contestation from other Indonesians. Accordingl/, the Islamist
understanding of Indonesia remained peripheral to-the ,, ,,,orrrral,,
practice of late colonial-era politics, and consequently disregarded
as a serious contribution to politics. An opportunity, neveito ap-
pear again in quite this form, had been lost.
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